Mob violence in Bangladesh has transformed from sporadic episodes of collective aggression into a persistent and structurally embedded phenomenon. Weak law enforcement, a culture of impunity, the rapid circulation of misinformation, and intense political polarisation have jointly normalised vigilante violence. Data from national human rights organisations indicate that between 2024 and 2025, hundreds of individuals were killed in mob-related incidents. The death of Sharif Osman Hadi—convener and spokesperson of Inqilab Moncho—while undergoing treatment abroad after being shot, illustrates the broader environment of insecurity and shrinking civic space in which political activism and public engagement increasingly carry fatal risks. Drawing on verified human rights reports, investigative journalism, and international human rights norms, this article analyses statistical trends, structural drivers, and the implications of mob violence for democratic governance in Bangladesh, while proposing policy-oriented interventions to restore the rule of law.
Introduction
The rule of law constitutes the normative foundation of democratic governance and human rights protection. In Bangladesh, however, an alarming pattern has emerged in which justice is frequently displaced from courts to streets. Mob violence—often justified as spontaneous public outrage or informal crime control—has become a recurring and deadly feature of social life. This phenomenon represents not only a violation of the right to life and due process, but also a profound erosion of state authority and democratic legitimacy.
Trends and Statistical Overview of Mob Violence
Available data reveal a sharp and sustained rise in mob-related violence. Law and Salish Kendra reported approximately 128 deaths from mob lynching in 2024. Human Rights Support Society documented at least 156 deaths from mob violence between January and November 2025. Other aggregated human rights assessments suggest that more than 200 fatalities occurred between August 2024 and September 2025 alone.
Although discrepancies exist due to definitional variations—such as “mob lynching,” “mob violence,” or “vigilante justice”—the overall trajectory is unambiguous. Mob violence has shifted from isolated incidents to a pattern of routine lethal violence, signalling systemic governance failure rather than episodic breakdown.
The Death of Sharif Osman Hadi and the Violent Political Context
The death of Sharif Osman Hadi, convener and spokesperson of Inqilab Moncho, while undergoing treatment at Singapore General Hospital, marks a critical moment in Bangladesh’s contemporary political climate. According to a verified report by Prothom Alo, Hadi had been critically injured by gunshot wounds, transferred abroad for advanced treatment, and ultimately succumbed to his injuries.
While Hadi’s case does not constitute mob lynching in the strictest sense, it is inseparable from the broader ecology of violence in which political mobilisation, civic activism, and dissent increasingly entail mortal danger. His death symbolises a wider condition of insecurity—a “fear state”—where public engagement is systematically undermined by violence and intimidation.
Structural Drivers of Mob Violence
Impunity and Weak Accountability
One of the central drivers of mob violence in Bangladesh is the persistence of impunity. Arrest and conviction rates in mob-related cases remain disproportionately low, despite large numbers of accused individuals being identified. This absence of consequences emboldens perpetrators and signals tacit tolerance of collective violence.
Misinformation and Digital Amplification
Social media platforms play a decisive role in accelerating violence. Unverified allegations and rumours often function as instantaneous verdicts, mobilising crowds before authorities can intervene or facts can be established.
Political and Social Polarisation
Intense political polarisation further legitimises violence by framing it as moral retribution rather than criminal wrongdoing. In such contexts, collective punishment is normalised, and legal restraint is portrayed as weakness.
Erosion of State Presence
Delayed, inconsistent, or ineffective responses by law enforcement agencies create a vacuum in which crowds assume the role of judge, jury, and executioner. This erosion of visible state authority reinforces the cycle of vigilante justice.
Implications for Human Rights and Democratic Governance
Mob violence constitutes a grave violation of internationally recognised human rights, including the right to life, the presumption of innocence, and protection from cruel and degrading treatment. Beyond individual harm, it erodes trust in legal institutions, disproportionately endangers minorities and marginalised communities, and discourages civic and political participation. In this sense, mob violence is both a symptom and a driver of democratic backsliding.
Policy Recommendations
To dismantle the culture of mob violence, this article proposes:
Legal recognition of mob violence as a priority criminal offence
Establishment of fast-track courts for mob-related cases
Creation of a national rumour-verification and rapid-response mechanism
Strengthening of community policing and civic education
Ensuring transparent investigations and visible accountability in every case
Conclusion
Mob violence in Bangladesh represents a profound crisis of justice, governance, and social order. Without decisive institutional reform and accountability, collective violence will continue to erode the moral and legal foundations of the state. The death of Sharif Osman Hadi stands as a stark reminder that the cost of inaction is measured in human lives. Restoring the rule of law is therefore not merely a legal imperative, but a democratic necessity.
References
Law and Salish Kendra. (2024). Human rights situation in Bangladesh 2024. Dhaka, Bangladesh: ASK.
Human Rights Support Society. (2025). Human rights observation report 2025 (January–November). Dhaka, Bangladesh: HRSS.
The Daily Star. (2024, August 12). Mob justice on the rise: A threat to rule of law.
United Nations. (1948). Universal Declaration of Human Rights. New York, NY: United Nations.
United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights. (2022). Human rights, vigilante violence and state responsibility. Geneva, Switzerland: United Nations.
Author
Minhaz Samad Chowdhury
Independent Human Rights Defender
Focus: State Violence, Political Rights, Religious Minority Rights, Democratic Accountability in Bangladesh

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