Recent remarks attributed to Sushila Karki, Nepal’s interim prime minister and former chief justice, that Nepal will not allow itself to slide into instability comparable to Bangladesh have resonated widely across South Asia. Internationally, the reaction has ranged from approval to discomfort. The more useful response, however, is analytical: what do these moments reveal about how democracies fail—and how they might be stabilised—before street politics displaces institutions?
The Policy Principle: States Cannot Govern by Street Veto
From a governance standpoint, the core principle is uncontroversial. No democratic system can function when authority is routinely overridden by crowd pressure. When policy outcomes are determined by mobilisation rather than mandate, three failures follow predictably: elections lose credibility, courts lose authority, and governments become reactive rather than strategic.
In that narrow sense, the warning attributed to Karki aligns with comparative democratic experience. Interim or transitional governments, in particular, must prevent paralysis if they are to shepherd credible elections and institutional continuity.
But principles divorced from context produce poor policy.
Bangladesh: Collapse Was Erosion-Driven, Not Crowd-Driven
Bangladesh’s current crisis is often mischaracterised internationally as a problem of “mob violence.” That framing obscures causality. The breakdown did not begin with the street; it began with institutional exhaustion—years of political exclusion, constrained civic space, and declining confidence in electoral and judicial remedies.
Under prolonged dominance—most visibly during the tenure of Sheikh Hasina—stability was managed, but resilience was not built. When trust finally fractured, the street became decisive not because citizens rejected institutions, but because institutions had ceased to be credible mediators. Policy responses that focus on suppressing mobilisation without rebuilding legitimacy risk repeating this cycle.
Nepal: A Preventive Window—Still Open
Nepal’s debate, by contrast, reflects a preventive moment. Institutions are strained; youth movements are impatient; party systems are fragmented. Yet the constitutional architecture still retains contestable legitimacy. The policy question there is how to absorb dissent into institutions before erosion accelerates.
This distinction matters for international actors. Nepal is not “better” than Bangladesh; it is earlier in the risk curve. Bangladesh illustrates the cost of delayed reform; Nepal illustrates the narrowing window for timely intervention.
Policy Implication 1: Authority Must Be Re-Legitimised, Not Asserted
International experience is unequivocal: asserting authority without restoring legitimacy accelerates collapse. Governments prevent street vetoes not by denunciation or force, but by:
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restoring competitive, credible elections;
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reopening civic space for lawful dissent;
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ensuring judicial independence and enforcement;
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and demonstrating impartial accountability.
These are not normative aspirations; they are risk-mitigation tools.
Policy Implication 2: Permanent Mobilisation Is Not Governance
Equally, international actors should avoid romanticising perpetual protest. Sustained mobilisation without institutionalisation creates capture risk—by extremists, criminal networks, or external actors seeking leverage. Donor strategies that amplify “voices” without strengthening channels inadvertently increase instability.
Policy Implication 3: External Actors Should Prioritise Institutional Credibility
South Asia’s current instability offers a cautionary lesson for donors and partners: governance conditionality focused on process metrics alone is insufficient. What matters is whether institutions are trusted to arbitrate conflict. Support should prioritise:
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electoral integrity and dispute resolution;
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judicial capacity and enforcement;
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media pluralism and safety;
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and mechanisms that convert protest energy into policy input.
Absent these, external engagement risks entrenching the very dynamics it seeks to prevent.
Conclusion: From Rhetoric to Risk Prevention
The claim that Bangladesh should “learn from Nepal” is misleading if taken literally. The correct lesson is structural: prevent erosion before it becomes a collapse. Bangladesh’s experience demonstrates the cost of delayed institutional repair; Nepal’s debate underscores the urgency of acting while legitimacy remains salvageable.
For international audiences, the takeaway is clear. Street rule is a symptom, not a cause. Preventing it requires rebuilding trust in institutions—not choosing sides between the state and the street. Where that rebuilding fails, no amount of rhetorical resolve will substitute for legitimacy.
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