Bangladesh HR Defender
Human Rights, Rule of Law and Public Policy
Rights Without Full Political Choice
Human Rights in Pakistan-Administered Azad Jammu and Kashmir—and a Roadmap for Remedy
Information updated:
Executive Summary
Azad Jammu and Kashmir, commonly abbreviated as AJK, possesses many of the formal institutions associated with representative government: an elected legislative assembly, a president, a prime minister, a superior judiciary, political parties, local institutions and an active civil society. Its Interim Constitution also recognises freedoms of expression, association, assembly, movement, religion, profession and property, alongside safeguards relating to detention and legal process.
Yet these institutions operate inside a political framework that does not permit the full range of peaceful constitutional choices. Article 7(3) of the AJK Interim Constitution prohibits individuals and political parties from advocating against the ideology of Jammu and Kashmir’s accession to Pakistan. The same constitution creates a 53-member assembly in which only 33 directly elected members represent people residing inside AJK, while 12 directly elected seats represent refugees living elsewhere in Pakistan and another eight members are indirectly elected.
The tension between formal rights and restricted political choice became acute during the mass movements of 2024–2026. Protests over electricity, food prices, governance, elite privileges and legislative representation produced policy concessions, demonstrating genuine civic agency. They also triggered communications shutdowns, mass arrests, the proscription of the Joint Awami Action Committee, allegations of lethal force, attacks on police and public facilities, and sharply conflicting casualty claims.
A durable remedy requires more than the restoration of order. It requires independent investigations, legal protection for peaceful dissent, judicial review of anti-terrorism measures, reform of internet-shutdown practices, accountable policing, constitutional dialogue on political pluralism and refugee representation, stronger local government, and meaningful participation by women, minorities and marginalised communities.
AJK at a Glance: A Visual Data Snapshot
These figures should not be treated as a final accounting. Communications restrictions, limited media access and competing narratives have repeatedly prevented comprehensive independent verification.
A Contested Territory—and Contested Language
Pakistan officially describes AJK as a self-governing territory with its own elected institutions. India refers to it as Pakistan-occupied Kashmir. International bodies and neutral news organisations commonly use “Pakistan-administered Kashmir.” The terminology is politically charged because India and Pakistan both claim the former princely state of Jammu and Kashmir, whose final status remains unresolved.
A human-rights analysis should not attempt to settle that territorial dispute through vocabulary. Its primary subjects must be the people who live in AJK: their lives, political choices, livelihoods, security, dignity and access to justice.
AJK is not represented as a distinct territory in Pakistan’s National Assembly or Senate. Pakistan’s official National Assembly composition allocates seats among the provinces and the federal capital, while AJK has no separate territorial representation. This creates a democratic gap because federal institutions may take decisions substantially affecting people who do not possess distinct territorial representation within those institutions.
Constitutional Rights—and the Boundary Around Political Choice
The AJK Interim Constitution protects peaceful assembly, freedom of association and freedom of speech, although each is subject to legally imposed restrictions. Freedom of expression may be restricted for security, public order, morality, defamation, contempt of court and friendly relations with Pakistan.
The central democratic concern lies in Article 7(3), which declares that no person or political party may propagate against, or participate in activities detrimental to, the ideology of accession to Pakistan. Oaths prescribed for senior political office also require loyalty to that cause.
Citizens may therefore compete within an approved political horizon, but peaceful advocacy for an independent Kashmir, a confederal arrangement or another constitutional alternative does not receive equal legal protection.
Elections may be procedurally competitive while remaining substantively incomplete when peaceful political alternatives are excluded before voters enter the polling station.
National security may justify restrictions on direct incitement to violence, armed organisation or foreign-directed sabotage. It does not automatically justify prohibiting nonviolent discussion about constitutional status.
Representation and the Dispute Over the Twelve Refugee Seats
The assembly comprises 53 members. Forty-five are directly elected: 33 by residents of AJK and 12 by specified refugee constituencies situated across Pakistan. Five women, one religious scholar, one overseas Kashmiri and one technocrat or professional are elected indirectly by directly elected members.
Supporters of the refugee seats argue that they preserve the legal and political unity of the former state of Jammu and Kashmir and protect the representation of communities displaced by conflict. Critics contend that people living outside AJK can influence or determine the formation of its government and allow Pakistan-based party structures to outweigh the preferences of territorial residents.
In June 2026, the AJK Supreme Court held that the 12 seats are constitutionally protected and cannot be removed through executive action. Alteration requires a formal constitutional amendment. The ruling affirmed lawful constitutional procedure but did not eliminate the legitimate democratic debate concerning the balance between refugee representation and territorial self-government.
Protest as Evidence of Civic Agency
AJK is not a society without public mobilisation. Traders, transport workers, lawyers, students and ordinary residents have organised large demonstrations and strikes. The 2024 movement over electricity tariffs, subsidised flour and governance obtained significant government concessions. A controversial public-order ordinance was also withdrawn after widespread opposition.
In September and October 2025, the Joint Awami Action Committee organised another territory-wide strike around a 38-point charter covering governance, representation and socioeconomic demands. Human Rights Commission of Pakistan reporting recorded at least nine deaths—six civilians and three police officers—and more than 200 injuries.
A negotiated agreement ended the immediate crisis, and the federal government accepted numerous demands and committed a financial package. The refugee-seat dispute remained unresolved.
This record supports two simultaneous conclusions: citizens possess significant organisational capacity, but their rights become especially vulnerable when public mobilisation develops into a confrontation with the state.
The 2026 Crackdown and the Problem of Verification
On 5 June 2026, AJK authorities designated the Joint Awami Action Committee a proscribed organisation under regional anti-terrorism legislation. Amnesty International described the subsequent response as involving an internet shutdown, mass arbitrary arrests and allegations of deadly force.
Reuters reported that, by 19 June, at least 24 people had died during nearly two weeks of unrest, based on government officials’ accounts: 20 civilians and four police officers. The regional police chief reported that 97 officers had been wounded and 515 people detained.
Roads, banking, fuel supply and communications were disrupted. The burden extended well beyond political participants, affecting day labourers, drivers, patients, students and small businesses.
During the first phase of the regional election on 27 July, protest leaders claimed that more than 30 people were killed around Rawalakot. Reuters could not independently verify that figure because internet, transport and information services remained disrupted.
The government alleged that armed and masked participants, including militants linked to the Pakistani Taliban, had infiltrated protests and attacked security personnel. Such allegations require independent investigation and, where supported by admissible evidence, prosecution through ordinary criminal procedure.
The presence of armed individuals, however, cannot transform an entire protest population into lawful targets. International standards require authorities to distinguish peaceful participants from persons committing violence.
Internet Shutdowns Are Human-Rights Measures, Not Technical Measures
A prolonged communications blackout restricts far more than political messaging. It obstructs emergency communication, banking, medical referrals, education, journalism, family contact, legal assistance, evidence preservation and independent monitoring.
It also benefits misinformation. When independently verifiable information disappears, propaganda from all sides becomes more difficult to challenge.
Any shutdown should therefore be prescribed by clear law, limited to the smallest possible geographic area and duration, independently reviewable, publicly reasoned and open to judicial challenge. Indefinite or territory-wide restrictions should be treated as presumptively disproportionate.
Elections Under Pressure
The 2026 election was divided into phases because of security concerns. The first phase was held on 27 July and the second on 2 August for much of Muzaffarabad division and the refugee constituencies. Some polling was postponed because of landslides, while the final Poonch phase was scheduled for 10 August.
Political parties made allegations concerning fraud, coercion, attacks and vote manipulation. During the second phase, one political worker was reported killed and others injured.
The existence of voting is significant, but a credible election requires more than ballot counting. It requires freedom of movement, communication, media access, security without intimidation, equal campaigning opportunities, transparent dispute resolution and the ability of voters to choose among lawful political alternatives.
Journalism, Dissent and Enforced Disappearance
Independent reporting has described journalism in AJK as affected by censorship, harassment, weak legal protection, unsafe working conditions and self-censorship. Discussion of the territory’s political status remains particularly sensitive.
The case of journalist and poet Ali Ahmed Farhad Shah illustrated the risks surrounding dissent. Reporters Without Borders reported that he was taken from his Islamabad home in May 2024 and later disclosed to be in AJK police custody over allegedly provocative online material. He was released on bail after approximately 30 days.
HRCP reported 71 AJK-related missing-person cases between March 2011 and June 2025. Sixty-one were listed as resolved and ten remained unresolved. Even one secret or unacknowledged detention creates a grave rule-of-law obligation because it removes the individual from ordinary judicial protection.
Women, Children and Marginalised Communities
AJK’s constitutional framework calls for women’s participation, and five assembly seats are reserved for women. Reserved representation, however, has not by itself resolved women’s limited formal employment, unpaid care burden, gender-based violence or obstacles to justice.
HRCP documented allegations of sexual violence, police harassment, moral policing and online blackmail in 2025. It also reported that the Social Welfare Department recorded 48 child-abuse cases in only two districts and warned that the true number was likely higher because child-protection units did not operate across all ten districts.
There have also been constructive measures. Transgender persons were retained within social-protection frameworks; an interest-free loan programme included women, transgender persons and persons with disabilities; and a specialised freelancing hub for persons with disabilities opened in Muzaffarabad.
Religious Freedom and Minority Protection
The constitution recognises religious practice and the right of denominations to manage places of worship, but provisions permitting penalties relating to the conversion of Muslims raise serious freedom-of-belief concerns.
HRCP reported that at least 76 Ahmadi graves were damaged in Kotli in March 2025, bringing the reported number of damaged Ahmadi gravestones during the first three months of the year to 169. Authorities registered a criminal case, but repeated attacks demonstrate that reactive prosecution alone is insufficient.
Minority protection requires prevention, equal policing, prosecution of perpetrators and public rejection of incitement—not merely formal constitutional guarantees.
Economic and Social Rights
The current crisis cannot be understood solely as a dispute over constitutional theory. Mobilisation has been fuelled by electricity pricing, flour subsidies, unemployment, public services, elite expenditure, resource distribution and weak local accountability.
Human-rights reporting has recorded progress in education, judicial digitalisation, social protection and specialised healthcare. It has also documented interrupted schooling, financial pressures on the University of AJK, suspension of health-support arrangements, climate disasters, transport risks and difficulty accessing essential services.
Communications blackouts and prolonged shutdowns deepen these harms. A wage worker who earns nothing during a shutdown, a patient unable to contact a hospital and a student excluded from digital learning experience the crisis as a violation of everyday human security.
A Rights-Based Roadmap for Remedy
Immediate Measures: First 30 Days
- Restore full communications, subject only to narrowly tailored, lawful and independently reviewable restrictions.
- Publish verified lists of the dead, injured, arrested and missing.
- Disclose detention locations and guarantee access to families and lawyers.
- Release peaceful detainees unless promptly charged with recognisable criminal offences.
- Create an independent commission to investigate every death and serious injury since June 2026.
- Guarantee media, legal and independent monitoring access to affected areas and detention facilities.
Legal and Institutional Reform: First Six Months
- Subject the proscription of the Joint Awami Action Committee to prompt and substantive judicial review.
- Replace collective punishment with individual criminal responsibility.
- Enact a detailed use-of-force law consistent with United Nations standards.
- Establish an independent police-complaints authority.
- Review laws criminalising vaguely defined false news, official criticism or peaceful dissent.
- Require written necessity assessments, time limits and judicial review for internet shutdowns.
- Establish an independent AJK human-rights commission with investigatory authority and budgetary autonomy.
Constitutional and Democratic Reform: One to Three Years
- Review Article 7(3) through an inclusive constitutional process.
- Protect peaceful advocacy of constitutional alternatives while prohibiting direct incitement to violence and armed activity.
- Conduct public hearings on refugee representation involving residents, refugees, women, youth and constitutional experts.
- Consider reforms preserving refugee representation while reducing disproportionate influence over government formation.
- Strengthen AJK participation in federal decisions concerning security, resources and the economy.
- Provide local governments with predictable development funding and meaningful administrative authority.
Protection of Vulnerable Groups
- Expand women’s direct electoral opportunities and workplace participation.
- Establish survivor-centred investigation and legal-aid mechanisms for gender-based violence.
- Operate child-protection units in every district.
- Adopt and enforce a uniform minimum marriage age consistent with international child-rights standards.
- Provide preventive protection for minority places of worship, cemeteries and community institutions.
- Create measurable access to education, employment, healthcare and justice for transgender persons and persons with disabilities.
Role of Pakistan and the International Community
Pakistan carries responsibilities for measures taken by federal agencies and institutions over which it exercises decisive influence. It should facilitate, rather than obstruct, transparent investigations and human-rights monitoring.
The United Nations Human Rights Office, treaty bodies and special procedures should seek regular access to both Pakistan-administered and Indian-administered parts of Kashmir. Monitoring should be even-handed.
Violations on one side of the Line of Control cannot excuse violations on the other.
International engagement should prioritise civilians, rights defenders, journalists and victims—not the geopolitical messaging of competing states.
Conclusion
AJK cannot accurately be described either as a place where no rights exist or as a fully free political order. Its people vote, organise, litigate, publish, protest and sometimes compel policy change. Its courts and legislature have demonstrated genuine institutional capacity.
Yet constitutional limits exclude peaceful political alternatives; representation remains contested; journalists and critics face pressure; and rights can contract rapidly during a security crisis.
The state has a legitimate duty to protect residents and police officers from armed attacks. Protest leaders likewise have a duty to prevent violence, protect medical facilities and cooperate with lawful investigations. Neither responsibility permits collective punishment, unaccountable lethal force, secret detention or prolonged information blackouts.
The most sustainable path is not the suppression of grievance but its constitutional management: truth, accountability, lawful policing, inclusive representation, local economic justice and freedom for peaceful political thought.
Whatever the eventual political future of Kashmir, the people of AJK cannot be required to postpone their rights to life, dignity, expression, justice and democratic participation until that future is resolved.
Selected Authoritative Sources
- Azad Jammu and Kashmir Interim Constitution, 1974
- Human Rights Commission of Pakistan, State of Human Rights in 2024
- Human Rights Commission of Pakistan, State of Human Rights in 2025
- Amnesty International statement on the June 2026 crackdown
- Amnesty International statement on communications restrictions and lethal-force allegations
- Reuters reporting on the June 2026 unrest
- Reuters reporting on the July 2026 election violence
- United Nations Human Rights Office report on Kashmir
- Associated Press reporting on the refugee-seat judgment
- Reporters Without Borders documentation concerning Ali Ahmed Farhad Shah
- United Nations Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms
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