Global affairs · Rule of law · Human security
Beyond the Strait:
Hormuz, Unaccountable Power and the Conditions of Global Peace
When armed factions can overturn diplomacy, and maritime passage becomes an instrument of coercion, the consequences reach far beyond the Gulf. A durable settlement must protect institutions, navigation and the people whose lives depend on both.
A narrow passage, a worldwide obligation
A seafarer waiting to cross a dangerous strait is someone’s parent, partner or child. Beyond the vessel are households waiting for affordable fuel, hospitals depending on reliable electricity and workers whose livelihoods depend on predictable trade. Their lives belong at the centre of any serious discussion of Hormuz.
The September 2026 impasse poses a question larger than who commands a stretch of water: can political institutions restrain the power exercised in their name? Diplomacy becomes fragile when an armed network can overturn a negotiated commitment. Maritime order becomes fragile when commercial passage depends on discretionary permission. Public trust becomes fragile when governments describe these failures as strategic success while people absorb the costs.
My argument is that domestic accountability and international stability are inseparable. Peace agreements require institutions capable of implementing them; institutions require scrutiny capable of exposing disobedience; and international rules require consistent application across allies and adversaries. A settlement that neglects any of these foundations may reduce immediate tension while leaving the machinery of the next crisis intact.
1. Diplomatic sabotage begins with institutional weakness
The 13 September report describes attacks on commercial vessels on 6–7 July as undermining the US–Iran memorandum signed on 17 June. It alleges that the attacks proceeded without prior approval from senior political and security authorities and links them to a faction associated with Taeb. The same account refers to competing Iranian allegations about US breaches of the understanding. These claims require scrutiny; they do not establish a single, settled explanation for the collapse. [1]
If the account of unauthorized action is substantiated, its importance extends beyond a dispute among officials. It would reveal a separation between the authority to negotiate and the capacity to control violence. A state might promise restraint while actors using its resources retain the practical ability to choose escalation. Its partners would then be bargaining with an institution unable to guarantee its own commitments.
That danger cannot be addressed merely by identifying an uncompromising personality. The deeper questions concern access to weapons, operational authorization, intelligence channels, financing and protection from investigation. Who could order the action? Who could stop it? Who recorded the decision? Who would face consequences? A credible inquiry must follow those institutional connections.
At the same time, analysts should avoid assuming that the presidency is necessarily the sole constitutional source of military authority. The relevant allocation of powers must be established rather than imported from another political system. The governing principle is that coercive power must have an identifiable legal basis, a verifiable chain of authority and meaningful avenues of review.
A peace agreement cannot be stronger than the institutions responsible for carrying it out.
2. Accountability must reach beyond the executive
The answer to fragmented command is not simply to concentrate unlimited power in one office. That could replace competing coercive centres with a single unaccountable centre. Constitutional government requires both effective control and effective restraint: the authority to prevent unauthorized action, and the obligation to justify authorized action.
A serious reform agenda would include protected records of operational decisions, independent investigation of alleged abuses, legislative scrutiny of security expenditure and access to remedies. Legitimate operational secrecy can be preserved through appropriately empowered oversight bodies. Secrecy should protect sensitive information, not remove the existence of a decision from legal examination.
These principles apply well beyond Iran. Every government that uses intelligence services, armed forces or partners outside its ordinary administrative structure must explain how lawful authority is maintained. Selective concern about accountability makes the principle appear to be a diplomatic weapon. Consistency gives it practical credibility.
Nor should a crisis extinguish peaceful criticism. Journalists, lawyers and civil society may identify failures before official institutions acknowledge them. Suppressing those voices removes opportunities for correction. A government that treats scrutiny as disloyalty risks confusing the preservation of its reputation with the protection of the public.
3. “Unauthorized” does not automatically mean “unattributable”
The International Law Commission’s state-responsibility articles distinguish attribution from breach. Article 7 provides that an organ, or an entity empowered to exercise governmental authority, acting in that capacity may engage the state even when it exceeds authority or contravenes instructions. Article 2 also requires a breach of an international obligation. Non-state actors raise separate questions, including those under Article 8. These articles are not themselves a standalone treaty. [2]
Consequently, a claim that senior leaders did not authorize an operation is relevant evidence, not automatic exoneration. Investigators must establish the actor’s status, capacity and conduct, and identify the obligation allegedly violated. Individual criminal responsibility is a separate inquiry. A newspaper allegation cannot substitute for either legal process.
This distinction matters politically. Without it, an authority could benefit from coercion and later disown the operators. But abandoning evidentiary discipline would create the opposite danger: punishment based on association or accusation. A rules-based response must resist both impunity and presumption of guilt.
4. Sovereignty and passage must coexist
UNCLOS Part III sets out the transit-passage framework for qualifying international straits. Article 38 addresses continuous and expeditious transit; Article 39 specifies duties of ships and aircraft. Articles 42 and 44 constrain interference by bordering states, while Article 43 provides for cooperation on navigational facilities and pollution prevention. Transit passage must not be confused with the distinct innocent-passage regime. [3]
Treaty status also matters. Oman is a party to UNCLOS; Iran has signed without ratifying, and the United States is not a party. Iran’s declaration contests aspects of the contractual entitlement to transit passage. Analysis must therefore address applicable customary law and state positions, rather than assuming identical treaty obligations for all participants. [4]
The policy challenge is to accommodate legitimate coastal concerns without turning passage into a discretionary concession. Navigational safety, environmental protection and rescue coordination deserve resources. Their administration should be transparent and compatible with applicable rights. Otherwise, an arrangement presented as cooperation could institutionalize the very insecurity it promises to resolve.
A durable agreement should state what authorities may require, what users are entitled to expect and how disputes will be resolved. Ambiguity may help negotiators announce an initial understanding, but operational ambiguity at sea can expose crews to immediate danger. Saving political face must not mean leaving seafarers to discover the real rules through confrontation.
5. The test for any payment is whether refusal remains possible
The supplied CNN report describes an Omani framework involving voluntary contributions for navigational safety and environmental protection, alongside regional objections to arrangements that might establish an unacceptable new status quo. It also identifies the difficulty of implementation without coordination with the United States. DAWN reports the postponement of the proposed regional meeting in the interests of consensus. Neither report establishes that a final framework was adopted. [5] [6]
Mandatory payment merely for passage is conceptually different from cooperative funding for defined services. Article 43 does not by itself settle the legality of a particular fee arrangement; compatibility with passage rights remains essential. [3]
My proposed practical test is straightforward. Can a vessel decline a purportedly voluntary contribution without losing safe, equal access? Are the services identifiable? Are budgets published and independently audited? Can users challenge discrimination? Does the arrangement expire unless renewed through a lawful process? These safeguards would help distinguish genuine cooperation from coercion expressed in administrative language.
There is a broader global interest here. If emergency disruption is rewarded with permanent discretionary control, future actors may see a reason to manufacture similar leverage elsewhere. That is a risk of precedent, not a prediction that all waterways have identical legal regimes. The incentive created by a settlement deserves attention alongside its immediate diplomatic convenience.
6. Military protection cannot replace a civilian settlement
The case for protecting threatened shipping must be assessed alongside the limits of military instruments. An escort may address an immediate danger while leaving the underlying dispute unresolved. A policy built entirely around repeated protection operations risks making exceptional measures permanent and leaving commercial confidence dependent on the continued presence of armed force.
Maritime rights, the legal basis for using force and the rules governing hostilities are distinct questions. Alleged misconduct by one side does not automatically establish the legality of every response. Nor does describing a measure as an inspection, blockade or defensive operation determine its legal character. Its purpose, conduct and consequences require examination.
International humanitarian law prohibits starvation of civilians as a method of warfare. Civilian survival must therefore remain central when evaluating restrictions on essential supplies. This feature does not reach a final legal conclusion on a particular blockade; that would require a fuller factual and legal record. [7]
The policy objective should be a transition from emergency protection to predictable civilian navigation. Rescue, medical evacuation and communication with crews should not wait for settlement of every strategic dispute. Negotiators can maintain separate tracks for immediate protection and longer-term political questions while ensuring that neither is used to obstruct the other.
7. Inclusive diplomacy is a practical requirement
Regional states have a legitimate interest in initiating discussions about their own security. The absence of a major power from an opening meeting does not make the initiative meaningless. Yet implementation requires engagement with actors capable of affecting it. Equally, an agreement between powerful adversaries cannot substitute for the participation of neighbours whose waters, ports and populations bear the consequences.
A workable process could connect three levels. Political negotiations would address commitments and grievances. Operational discussions would define communication, routes, safety procedures and incident response. Civilian consultation would bring in seafarers, shipping operators, insurers and affected importing economies. Participation need not mean identical seats at every meeting; it must mean relevant interests are heard and responsibilities are clear.
Oman’s convening role could support such a structure if the parties agree. Technical organizations can contribute within their mandates, but the International Maritime Organization should not be imagined as a ceasefire enforcement authority. Institutions are more useful when their actual capabilities are understood than when their names are used to lend credibility to an undefined promise.
Consensus must also avoid becoming an indefinite veto over civilian protection. A comprehensive settlement may take time. Limited agreements on rescue, notification and evidence preservation can be pursued earlier. Such steps should preserve legal positions without postponing measures that reduce immediate harm.
8. The Global South pays for decisions it rarely controls
For countries outside the principal bargaining circle, the relevant question is often how a distant confrontation changes the cost of ordinary life. Disruption can affect freight, insurance and energy costs, which may influence production, transport and household budgets. These are possible transmission channels, not quantified estimates of present losses in Bangladesh or any other country.
The burden is unlikely to be distributed evenly. A household with little disposable income has fewer options when essential costs rise. A small enterprise may be unable to absorb uncertainty that a larger competitor can finance. Governments face choices over subsidies, social support and public services. Treating these consequences as merely external to strategic competition conceals who actually bears the risk.
Bangladesh’s interests therefore include reliable supplies, transparent procurement, protection for seafarers and migrant workers, and careful management of public resources. A preparedness programme should assess exposure, review alternative suppliers and establish clear consular communication. It should also protect low-income households through targeted measures rather than assume that every broad subsidy is equally effective.
The Global South is not a single negotiating bloc with identical interests. Exporters and importers, coastal and landlocked states, governments and vulnerable communities may experience the crisis differently. That diversity strengthens the case for consultation based on exposure and need. It does not justify excluding those outside the military contest.
The global consequences of a crisis should confer a voice on those who bear its costs, not only on those who command its weapons.
9. Human rights must shape the measures of success
The Human Rights Committee’s General Comment No. 36 connects the right to life with life in dignity and addresses its continuing relevance during armed conflict. That provides a necessary perspective on policies affecting civilian survival. It does not turn every increase in energy prices into a proven human-rights violation; specific obligations, jurisdiction and facts still matter. [8]
Nevertheless, policy evaluation should ask whether people can obtain essential supplies, whether crews can work safely and whether vulnerable households retain access to basic services. A statement that a waterway is strategically controlled says little about those outcomes. Public reporting should make the human consequences visible.
Sanctions policy requires the same attention to implementation. A humanitarian exemption has limited practical value if a lawful shipment cannot obtain payment services, insurance or transport. Authorities should examine where transactions fail, clarify permissible activity and provide workable channels for essential trade. These are recommendations for evaluating effectiveness, not a claim that all sanctions share one purpose or legal status.
Humanitarian protection also needs credible safeguards against diversion. Transparency, independent monitoring and accessible complaints can address that concern without making civilian access indefinitely conditional. The aim is a system in which protection works in practice and its operation can be checked.
10. Resilience should reduce dependence on coercion
Alternative routes, diversified supply and energy efficiency can reduce exposure to disruption, but their value must be assessed against cost, capacity and implementation time. Infrastructure announcements should not be mistaken for immediately available substitutes. Nor should a new route transfer environmental damage or insecurity to another community without scrutiny.
A responsible long-term strategy combines diversified energy systems, improved efficiency, resilient public services and prudent contingency planning. For importing economies, this means evaluating investments transparently and avoiding emergency procurement arrangements that create lasting fiscal burdens. Measures adopted under pressure still require competitive safeguards and public accountability.
Resilience and diplomacy reinforce one another when they reduce the ability to hold civilian life hostage to confrontation. They work against one another when diversification is presented as a reason to abandon the safety of people who remain dependent on an existing route. The transition should reduce vulnerability while maintaining protection today.
The conditions of a peace worth defending
Hormuz illustrates how quickly an institutional failure can become a global insecurity. The chain runs from an opaque decision to a threatened ship, from uncertainty at sea to difficult choices in a distant household. A responsible international order must recognize every link in that chain.
No durable solution will come from declarations of control alone. The necessary work is less theatrical: credible command, independent scrutiny, clear commitments, lawful navigation, reliable humanitarian access and mechanisms that allow disputes to be addressed before they become renewed violence.
Constitutional supremacy must mean power constrained by law and rights, not simply obedience to the most powerful office. International cooperation must mean reciprocal obligations rather than the permanent privilege of whichever actor can impose the greatest disruption. Public policy must judge outcomes through the security of people as well as the preferences of states.
The most convincing proof of peace will be ordinary life becoming possible again: a crew returning home safely, a hospital receiving its supplies, a family facing tomorrow without another imposed uncertainty. That is the horizon diplomacy should serve.
Sources and editorial method
- The Times of Israel, “Iran hardliners launched Hormuz attacks in defiance of leaders, undermining US deal — report,” 13 September 2026. Secondary reporting of a New York Times investigation. Allegations remain attributed.
- International Law Commission, Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (2001). Especially Articles 2, 4, 5, 7 and 8.
- United Nations, UNCLOS Part III: Straits Used for International Navigation. Especially Articles 38–44.
- UN Treaty Collection, UNCLOS participation and declarations.
- CNN, Kylie Atwood and Zachary Cohen, “Iran-Gulf talks without US participation on reopening the Strait of Hormuz postponed, Omani official says.” Article text reviewed in the supplied PDF; proposals are not represented as adopted law.
- DAWN / AFP, “Oman says Hormuz talks with Iran, Gulf states postponed ‘in interests of consensus’,” 14 September 2026. Date as printed in the supplied report; the underlying announcement was made on 13 September.
- ICRC, Customary International Humanitarian Law, Rule 53: Starvation as a Method of Warfare.
- UN Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 36: Article 6, Right to Life.
Reported events, legal rules and the author’s inferences are distinguished throughout. Economic pathways are qualitative analyses, not estimates of current losses. This article does not determine individual guilt, resolve disputed treaty interpretations or claim that a specific tribunal has automatic jurisdiction.
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