MADE IN INDIA: THE SUPPLY OF WEAPONS AND AMMUNITION TO ISRAEL
India's Defence-Industrial Nexus, State Responsibility, and the Foreseeable Risk of Complicity in Gaza
I. Context & Executive Premise: From Non-Alignment to Co-Production
This investigation is anchored in a single evidentiary finding, now forensically documented by Amnesty International: between 7 October 2023 and 30 November 2025, Indian entities shipped 2,596 consignments of small arms, ordnance, and military vehicle components to Israel. Of these, Amnesty conservatively classified 788 as unequivocally military end-use, comprising at least 390,516 small arms parts, 564,970 parts of explosive ordnance, and 298 military vehicle components transferred to Israeli defence primes that are direct suppliers to the Israeli armed forces.
The figure is an undercount by design. Hundreds of shipments containing dual-use small arms components with ambiguous customs descriptions were excluded. The dataset captures only HS Codes 9301-9307 and 8710, and excludes shipments where civilian end-use could not be ruled out. The true magnitude of the Indo-Israeli defence material flow therefore substantially exceeds this report.
The transfers must be read against two ruptures. First, the post-October 2023 reality in the occupied Gaza Strip. As of 1 July 2026, the Ministry of Health in Gaza reported more than 73,000 Palestinians killed and 173,500 injured. Amnesty International (December 2024), the UN Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Occupied Palestinian Territory (September 2025), and a growing consensus of human rights organizations have determined that Israel is committing genocide against Palestinians in Gaza, alongside its system of apartheid and unlawful occupation.
Second, the legal rupture at the International Court of Justice. On 26 January 2024, in Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (South Africa v. Israel), the ICJ found a plausible risk of genocide and ordered binding provisional measures. In its Order of 30 April 2024 in Nicaragua v. Germany, the Court explicitly reminded all States of their international obligations relating to the transfer of arms to parties to an armed conflict to avoid the risk of violation of the Geneva Conventions and the Genocide Convention. In July 2024, the ICJ Advisory Opinion on the Legal Consequences of Israel's policies in the OPT declared Israel's continued presence unlawful and obliged third states not to render aid or assistance in maintaining it.
Against this backdrop, India's posture represents a historic inversion. The Republic that anchored the Non-Aligned Movement, voted for UNGA Resolution 3379, recognized the PLO in 1974 and the State of Palestine in 1988, and conditioned full diplomatic relations with Israel until 1992, has re-engineered itself into a co-producer within Israel's military-industrial complex. This is not legacy import dependence from the post-Kargil era, when Israel emerged as a major supplier to India. It is deliberate, state-enabled export manufacturing.
The 17th India-Israel Joint Working Group on Defence Cooperation (Tel Aviv, 4 November 2025) and the February 2026 India-Israel Joint Statement committing to “promote co-development and co-production” were signed after 16 months of documented genocide. That chronology is not incidental. It evidences policy choice, not commercial inertia.
II. Empirical Supply Chain & Manufacturing Evidence
2.1 Methodology and Scale of Transfers
Amnesty’s methodology relied on two commercially available shipment-level trade databases covering HS Chapter 93 (Arms and ammunition; parts and accessories) and Heading 8710 (armoured fighting vehicles). Shipments with any reference to air-defence (interceptor) parts for Iron Dome-type systems — defensive in nature — were methodologically excluded where identifiable, as were hundreds of ambiguous pistol parts.
Even under this conservative filter, the data shows systemic supply:
- HS 9305.91.00 — Military weapons parts: 354 shipments, of which 315 were small arms parts (bolt carriers, feeding trays, auto sears) after removing 39 air-defence-related consignments to Rafael.
- HS 9305.10.00 — Revolver/pistol parts: 1,838 shipments, with at least 54 conservatively identified as military-only based on descriptors like 5.56x45 bolts, 7.62 gas blocks, auto sears, Negev-specific references.
- HS 9306.90.00 — Ordnance “others”: 389 shipments, predominantly artillery shell bodies, rocket parts, drone warheads, and unidentifiable munitions metal parts coded SCOMET 6A003.
- HS 8710 — Armoured vehicles: 15 shipments, including sensors, launchers, tracks.
2.2 Unmanned Aerial Systems: Adani-Elbit Hyderabad
Adani-Elbit Advanced Systems India Limited, a joint venture established in 2016, inaugurated India’s first private UAV manufacturing facility in Hyderabad (December 2018). Its stated mandate: manufacture the Hermes 900 Medium Altitude Long Endurance UAV, a primary platform used by the Israeli Air Force for surveillance and strike operations in Gaza. While the Hermes 900 airframe transfers are not captured as complete systems in customs data — they move as aerostructures and subsystems under joint venture production-sharing — the venture’s existence institutionalizes India as a production node for a system whose use in Gaza has been extensively documented by Al Jazeera, Middle East Eye and the Open Source Munitions Portal.
Under international humanitarian law, a facility that manufactures subsystems integral to a weapon system used in an armed conflict acquires a sufficient nexus to that conflict. Personnel and corporate leadership may therefore fall within IHL's personal scope where their activities are closely connected to military operations (ICRC, Private Businesses and Armed Conflict, 2024).
2.3 State-Owned and Private Munitions Complex
2.4 Small Arms, Tavor Rifles and Negev Components: PLR Systems and IWI
PLR Systems is not a mere parts supplier. Established as a technology transfer hub for IWI's Tavor X95, Galil ACE, and Negev platforms, its Adani-IWI equity structure ensures Israeli design control and Indian manufacturing scale. The shipment of 10,571 feeding trays cannot be dismissed as “accessories” — in a belt-fed machine gun, the feeding tray is a critical lethality component without which sustained automatic fire is impossible. The 33,033 bolt carriers similarly constitute the core operating mechanism of self-loading rifles.
Indo-MIM's automatic sears reveal a deeper supply chain logic: precision metal injection molding (MIM) of military-grade fire control components that are then integrated in Israel into final weapons systems destined for Israeli infantry units deployed in Gaza. This is not an indirect link; under UNGPs, this is a direct linkage via business relationship beyond first tier.
2.5 Loitering Munitions: Alpha Design / Alpha Elsec and SkyStriker
The SkyStriker loitering munition is an autonomous-capable, man-in-the-loop “suicide drone” that loiters over a target area before diving with its warhead. The 5kg warhead identified in Amnesty's trade data corresponds exclusively to SkyStriker within Elbit's catalogue (a 10 kg variant also exists). The OSMP identification of SkyStriker debris in Khan Younis on 17 April 2025, combined with Alpha Elsec's promotion of SkyStriker at DEFEXPO 2022 (booth video, minute 2:17), closes the chain: Indian-manufactured warheads integrated in Israel into loitering munitions used in Gaza.
2.6 Logistical Routes & Interdictions: Marianne Danica and Borkum
Beyond the Indian export dataset, the broader maritime logistics of India-origin munitions to Israel has drawn public scrutiny, illuminating systemic risk:
- MV Marianne Danica (April-May 2024): Danish-flagged vessel carrying 27 tonnes of explosive material reportedly originating from India's Premier Explosives and MIL supply chain, destined for Israel, was denied transit by Spain. Spanish authorities cited compliance with their policy not to facilitate arms transfers to Israel. The vessel was forced to reroute. The incident triggered a Right to Information request in India regarding export licences to Elbit Systems Land and IAI — a request DGFT has left unanswered as of June 2026.
- MV Borkum (May 2024): Antigua and Barbuda-flagged vessel carrying Indian-origin military cargo, also destined for Israel, was subject to protests by the Water Transport Workers Federation of India (representing 3,000+ workers across 11 ports) who announced a boycott of weapon shipments to Israel. Civil society groups in Cartagena, Spain, also mobilized to block docking. While the Indian government maintained the cargo was not military, independent verification of bills of lading showed SCOMET-listed items.
These interdictions demonstrate that even third-state transit jurisdictions are applying heightened due diligence and refusing facilitation, a standard India has not applied at the point of origin.
III. International Legal Frameworks & State Responsibility
3.1 Genocide Convention Article III(e) — Complicity and the Bosnia v. Serbia Due Diligence Threshold
Article III(e) of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (1948) criminalizes complicity in genocide. India's obligations under the Convention are dual: (i) Article I — to prevent and punish; (ii) Article III — not to be complicit.
The ICJ's 2007 judgment in Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro remains the controlling precedent. The Court held at para 430 that the duty to prevent entails employing “all means reasonably available” and responsibility is incurred if a state “manifestly failed to take all measures to prevent genocide which were within its power, and which might have contributed to preventing the genocide.” Para 431 establishes a knowledge trigger: the obligation arises at the instant a state learns of, or should normally have learned of, the existence of a serious risk.
India met the knowledge threshold no later than 26 January 2024. The ICJ's provisional measures order was widely publicized, debated in the Indian Parliament, and directly referenced in the PIL filed before the Supreme Court. Amnesty’s July 2026 report documents that at least 1,900+ of the 2,596 shipments occurred after that date, including MIL's 155mm HE shells and Alpha Elsec's 122 SkyStriker warheads in December 2025 — nearly two years after the ICJ warning.
Under Article III(e), complicity does not require shared genocidal intent; it requires knowledge that assistance will facilitate commission, and provision of means that have that effect. Supplying 1,000 high-explosive artillery shells to Elbit Systems, Israel's largest supplier of 155mm rounds under a $760M ammunition order (Breaking Defense, May 2024), meets that threshold.
3.2 Common Article 1 of the Geneva Conventions — Obligation to Ensure Respect
Common Article 1 provides: “The High Contracting Parties undertake to respect and to ensure respect for the present Convention in all circumstances.” The 2025 ICRC Updated Commentary (para 224, 228) clarifies that this includes a negative obligation not to contribute to violations, including through transfers of arms, ammunition or components where there is clear risk.
India ratified the four Geneva Conventions on 9 November 1950. As a High Contracting Party, it is prohibited from transferring or permitting private actors to transfer weapons to a party involved in armed conflict where there is a clear risk the transfer would contribute to IHL violations. The risk assessment here is not speculative:
- Amnesty, Human Rights Watch, B'Tselem and Palestinian NGOs documented indiscriminate attacks, direct attacks on civilians, destruction of hospitals (Al-Shifa shelling evidence, Le Monde Nov 2023), and use of 155mm artillery in densely populated areas.
- The UN Human Rights Council Resolution of 5 April 2024 called on all states to cease arms transfers to Israel to prevent further IHL violations. India abstained — suggesting awareness of the legal concern, not ignorance.
- The ICJ Advisory Opinion July 2024 found Israel's continued presence in OPT unlawful and obligated third states not to render aid or assistance.
Continued export of mortar launchers, artillery bodies, and targeting sensors after these findings constitutes a breach of Common Article 1.
3.3 ATT Articles 6 & 7 and ARSIWA Article 16 — Normative Application Despite Non-Signatory Status
India abstained from the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) in 2013, arguing it was “weak on terrorism and non-state actors.” Non-ratification does not, however, insulate India from customary standards that ATT codifies.
Amnesty's legal analysis correctly invokes ATT as a best-practice benchmark. India's DGFT Guidelines for Export of SCOMET Items already require assessment of “credibility of end-user, credibility of declaration of end-use, integrity of chain of transmission, and potential to contribute to end uses not in conformity with India’s national security or foreign policy goals and obligations under treaties to which it is a State Party.” Since India is a party to the Genocide Convention and Geneva Conventions, treaty obligations should have been considered. No public record exists that they were.
Further, under Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (ARSIWA) Article 16, a state which aids or assists another state in the commission of an internationally wrongful act incurs responsibility if (a) it has knowledge of the circumstances, and (b) the act would be internationally wrongful if committed by the assisting state. The ILC Commentary notes that aid includes the provision of means. Transferring artillery shells and drone warheads with knowledge of plausible genocide, documented war crimes, and unlawful occupation satisfies Article 16. Article 41(2) adds an obligation not to render aid or assistance in maintaining a serious breach of a peremptory norm (jus cogens), including the right to self-determination and the prohibition of apartheid.
3.4 Corporate Responsibility — UNGPs and Heightened Due Diligence
Corporate actors bear independent responsibility under UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (UNGPs Principles 11, 13, 17). The responsibility to respect human rights exists over and above compliance with national law (Commentary to Principle 11). In conflict-affected areas, the UNDP Guide on Heightened Human Rights Due Diligence requires ongoing assessment of conflict, review of independent reporting, and mapping of the value chain from origin to end-user.
Where companies receive information that their products have been used to commit serious violations, they are “directly linked” (UNGP 13(b)). They must use leverage to prevent future transfers and, where they have contributed, provide remediation (Principle 22). Failure to conduct such due diligence after January 2024 provisional measures and repeated UN expert calls (June 2024: “States and companies must end arms transfers to Israel immediately”) exposes corporate officers to potential criminal liability for complicity in international crimes — as affirmed by ICTY Tadić and Dutch Supreme Court Kouwenhoven (ECLI:NL:HR:2018:2349) regarding arms supplies.
IV. Domestic Governance, Judicial Deference & Constitutional Intersections
4.1 DGFT, SCOMET and the Opacity of Inter-Ministerial Review
India's export control regime is fragmented across: Industries (Development and Regulation) Act 1951 (IDRA) for manufacturing licences; Arms Act 1959; Foreign Trade (Development and Regulation) Act 1992; Customs Act 1962 section 11(2)(q) enabling prohibition for fulfillment of UN Charter obligations; and DGFT SCOMET List Category 6 for munitions.
The IDRA factors — production capacity, quality, location, conservation of resources of national importance, concerns to public interest — do not include human rights due diligence. The Arms Rules 2016 similarly omit any IHL assessment. The structural failure is identical across instruments: none requires assessment of human rights impact of arms being manufactured or exported.
For SCOMET Category 6 items, export requires DGFT authorization after inter-ministerial review by MEA, MHA and MOD (Handbook of Procedures, Chapter 10, para 10.06). This review is confidential; only the grant/denial outcome is public. Amnesty's RTI request (September 2025) seeking export licences issued to Premier Explosives and Blue Stampings & Forgings for transfers to IAI and Elbit Systems Land, plus any due diligence policies, received no response by publication (July 2026). Similarly, Amnesty's letters to the Ministry of Defence and DGFT (16 June 2026) and to 15 companies (23 June - 10 July 2026) received no written responses.
For DPSUs, this opacity is compounded by direct state ownership. MIL, IOL and AWEIL are 100% Government of India, funded by GoI (MIL: INR 7,450 million in 2024/25 alone, 75% future capex committed), chaired by appointees of the Appointments Committee of the Cabinet (PM + Home Minister), staffed by MOD officials on deputation, audited by the Comptroller and Auditor General. They satisfy all factors in Ajay Hasia v. Khalid Mujib (1981) and the cumulative control test in Pradeep Kumar Biswas (2002) — financially, functionally and administratively dominated by government, thus “State” under Article 12. The Law Commission's 145th Report confirms this position is “clearly established.”
Under international law, they meet ICJ's “complete dependence” test for de facto state organs (Bosnia v. Serbia para 392-393). Their conduct — manufacturing and exporting 155mm HE shells, mortar launchers, IR sensors — is therefore directly attributable to India under ARSIWA Article 4 and Article 8 (effective control for specific operations).
4.2 Judicial Deference: Ashok Kumar Sharma & Ors v. Union of India (2024)
On 9 September 2024, the Supreme Court of India dismissed Writ Petition (Civil) 551 of 2024 filed by 24 former civil servants, scholars and activists seeking cancellation of existing licences and a halt to new licences for export of arms to Israel during the Gaza conflict. The petition relied on ICJ orders, the Genocide Convention, and the Geneva Conventions.
The Court's reasoning invoked three doctrines:
- Non-justiciability of foreign affairs: adjudicating licence cancellation would require deciding allegations against “an independent sovereign nation, namely, Israel” which is not amenable to the jurisdiction of the Court.
- Contractual sanctity and commercial consequences: cancellation would compel breach of international contracts, exposing Indian companies to damages — consequences not appropriately assessable judicially.
- Executive discretion: statutory powers to prohibit exports exist under the FTDR Act and Customs Act, and whether to act is for the executive to decide in light of “economic, geo-political and other interests.”
This deference is inconsistent with India's own jurisprudence where courts have enforced international human rights norms domestically (Vishaka v. State of Rajasthan 1997, K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India 2017) and where the Delhi High Court in 2024 (Mukesh Kumar Jha v. MP-IDSA) applied the Article 12 test to a defence research body, finding it to be “state.” If a research institute is state, a 100% GoI-owned arms manufacturer is unambiguously state.
4.3 Constitutional Intersections: Article 51(c) and Article 21
Article 51(c) of the Directive Principles directs the state to foster respect for international law and treaty obligations. While Directive Principles are non-justiciable, the Supreme Court has repeatedly used them to inform the interpretation of fundamental rights. Article 21 — “No person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure established by law” — has been interpreted to include the right to live with dignity, and to oblige the State not to facilitate actions that foreseeably deprive life arbitrarily.
When MIL, a “State” under Article 12, transfers 1,000 HE shells to a defence prime known to supply Israeli forces engaged in plausible genocide, it implicates Article 21's positive obligation read with Article 51(c). The export licensing regime's failure to incorporate HRDD thus is not merely a policy gap; it is a constitutional failure to align executive action with India's international law obligations.
V. Policy Recommendations & Strategic Accountability
The evidence compels a shift from discretionary, opaque licensing to mandatory, human rights-based regulation aligned with jus cogens norms. Recommendations flow from both state responsibility and corporate responsibility tracks.
5.1 To the Government of India
2. Suspend Co-production MOUs: Suspend implementation of the November 2025 MoU on co-development and co-production with Israel pending an independent human rights impact assessment by the NHRC and a parliamentary committee, with public disclosure.
3. Disclosure of Licences: Publish all SCOMET Category 6 export licences granted to Elbit Systems, Rafael Advanced Defence Systems Ltd, IAI and their Indian JVs since 7 October 2023, including end-use certificates and risk assessments, in compliance with the RTI Act, 2005.
5. Parliamentary Oversight Mechanism: Establish a Standing Committee on Defence Exports, modelled on UK Committees on Arms Export Controls, with power to scrutinize SCOMET licences, summon officials, and recommend suspension. Require an annual report to Parliament on defence exports by destination and human rights risk rating.
6. Implementing Legislation for Genocide Convention & Geneva Conventions: Enact comprehensive legislation establishing genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes as offences under domestic law, providing universal jurisdiction, and creating independent investigative unit within CBI or NIA for corporate complicity.
7. Accession to Arms Trade Treaty: Accede to ATT and align SCOMET with ATT Articles 6 & 7 prohibitions, including prohibition on transfer where there is knowledge that arms would be used to commit genocide or grave breaches.
8. Investigate Potential Complicity: As recommended by Amnesty, launch independent investigations into potential civil and criminal responsibility of nine identified companies and responsible officers for complicity in genocide where reasonable grounds exist that approvals, licensing and continued execution despite widely documented risk contributed to the commission.
5.2 To Companies: Adani-Elbit, PLR Systems, Indo-MIM, Kalyani, Alpha Elsec, Ashoka, Premier Explosives, MIL, IOL, AWEIL
- Immediately cease involvement in the transfer of arms and ammunition to Israel, including related technologies, parts and components, technical assistance, and training.
- Cease all business relationships, including investments, purchases, joint R&D, participation in arms fairs with Elbit Systems, Rafael, IAI until they can demonstrate non-contribution to serious violations — consistent with UN Special Rapporteur Albanese’s prima facie responsibility standard (A/HRC/59/23, para 19).
- Conduct heightened human rights due diligence across the entire value chain — from point of origin to end-user — to identify, prevent, and mitigate involvement in abuses, mapping indirect business relationships beyond first tier, reviewing independent conflict reporting, and using leverage to prevent future transfers.
- Where contribution identified, provide or cooperate in remediation to persons harmed, per UNGP Principle 22.
- Publicly disclose due diligence findings and steps taken to cease transfers, to enable investor and civil society scrutiny.
5.3 Strategic Accountability Beyond Embargo
An embargo alone does not address structural impunity. Three additional accountability levers are required:
- Judicial Review Reform: Parliament should clarify via amendment to FTDR Act that export licensing decisions are subject to judicial review on grounds of compliance with international law obligations, not merely procedural irregularity, to prevent blanket invocation of foreign policy non-justiciability where jus cogens is at stake.
- End-User Verification Protocol: Mandate legally binding End-User Certificates prohibiting use in OPT, re-export without consent, and requiring return or destruction if violations documented; empower customs authorities under Customs Act sec 11(2)(q) to seize shipments where breach suspected.
- Alignment with Jus Cogens: Recognize that prohibitions on genocide, apartheid and acquisition of territory by force are peremptory norms; no economic, geopolitical or contractual interest can justify aid or assistance in their violation (ARSIWA Art 41). Defence export policy must be explicitly subordinated to these norms.
VI. Conclusion: The Weight of Foreseeability
The defence that arms exports are commercial, that licences are granted case-by-case, or that final use is unknown, collapses under the evidentiary weight documented in this analysis. When a state-owned enterprise manufactures 155mm high-explosive shells and labels them “Defence goods,” when a private joint venture ships 10,571 feeding trays for a machine gun model that exists only in Israeli service, when a Bengaluru facility exports automatic sears that enable fully automatic fire and 122 warheads for a loitering munition whose debris is photographed in Khan Younis — and when all this occurs after the International Court of Justice has ordered provisional measures, after the UN Human Rights Council has called for a halt, after 73,000 Palestinians have been killed — the risk is no longer abstract. It is foreseeable, documented, and attributable.
India’s historical solidarity with Palestinian self-determination was not sentimental rhetoric. It was a legal posture rooted in anti-colonialism and respect for international law. The current posture as co-producer in supply chains enabling plausible genocide in Gaza inverts that posture without parliamentary debate, without transparent risk assessment, and without judicial corrective.
The law does not require that India intended genocide to be complicit. It requires that India knew of serious risk and failed to employ all means reasonably available to prevent facilitation. Under Bosnia v. Serbia, under Common Article 1, under ARSIWA Article 16, that threshold has been met. The continued transfers after January 2024, the deepening of co-production in November 2025, and the judicial foreclosure in September 2024 together constitute a governance failure that engages state responsibility.
“A State’s obligation to prevent, and the corresponding duty to act, arise at the instant that the State learns of, or should normally have learned of, the existence of a serious risk that genocide will be committed.” — ICJ, Bosnia v. Serbia (2007), para 431
As a human rights defender and governance analyst, I do not argue that India must disengage from defence manufacturing or from strategic partnerships per se. I argue that governance without human rights due diligence is not governance; it is abdication. That licensing without transparency is not discretion; it is impunity. And that production of weapons that end up in a theatre where genocide is plausible, without rigorous, public, independent assessment of risk, places India — and its companies, and their officers — in the zone of legal exposure that international law reserves for complicity.
The remedial path is clear, actionable, and consistent with India’s own constitutional directives: cease transfers, disclose licences, legislate mandatory HRDD, subject export decisions to parliamentary and judicial oversight, and align foreign policy with peremptory norms. Until then, every shipment marked “Made in India” that lands in Israel carries with it not only metal and explosive, but the foreseeable risk that it will be used in violation of the most fundamental rules that India pledged to foster respect for.
References & Evidentiary Sources
- Amnesty International, MADE IN INDIA: THE SUPPLY OF WEAPONS AND AMMUNITION TO ISRAEL, Index: ASA 20/1327/2026, July 2026. Analyzed 2,596 shipments (2,580 under HS 9301-9307, 16 under HS 8710) between 7 Oct 2023 – 30 Nov 2025. Findings: 390,516 small arms parts, 564,970 ordnance parts, 298 vehicle components.
- ICJ, Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide in the Gaza Strip (South Africa v. Israel), Order on Provisional Measures, 26 Jan 2024; Order 28 March 2024; Order 24 May 2024.
- ICJ, Alleged Breaches of Certain International Obligations in Respect of the Occupied Palestinian Territory (Nicaragua v. Germany), Order 30 April 2024, para 24.
- ICJ, Legal Consequences arising from the Policies and Practices of Israel in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, Advisory Opinion, 19 July 2024.
- ICJ, Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), Judgment, 26 Feb 2007, paras 392-393, 397-398, 400, 430-432.
- Genocide Convention, 9 Dec 1948, Arts I, III(e). Geneva Conventions, Common Article 1; ICRC Updated Commentary 2025, paras 224, 228.
- Arms Trade Treaty, Arts 6, 7. ARSIWA Arts 4, 8, 16, 41(2). UNGPs on Business and Human Rights, Principles 11, 13, 14, 17, 22; UNDP Guide on Heightened HRDD in Conflict-Affected Contexts (2022).
- Supreme Court of India, Ashok Kumar Sharma & Ors v. Union of India, Writ Petition (Civil) 551 of 2024, Judgment 9 Sept 2024.
- Supreme Court of India, Ajay Hasia v. Khalid Mujib, AIR 1981 SC 487; Pradeep Kumar Biswas v. Indian Institute of Chemical Biology, (2002) 5 SCC 111; High Court of Delhi, Mukesh Kumar Jha v. MP-IDSA, W.P.(C) 5864/2021, 16 April 2024; Law Commission of India, 145th Report on Article 12.
- India: Industries (Development and Regulation) Act 1951; Arms Act 1959; Foreign Trade (Development and Regulation) Act 1992; Customs Act 1962 sec 11(2)(q); DGFT SCOMET List Category 6, Handbook of Procedures Chapter 10, Guidelines for Export of SCOMET Items; Constitution of India Arts 12, 21, 51(c).
- Trade Data Points: PLR Systems — 10,571 feeding trays (30 shipments), 33,033 bolt carriers; Indo-MIM — 59,637 automatic sears; Kalyani — 9,600 155mm bodies; MIL — 1,000 155mm HE shells; AWEIL — 120 81mm launchers Feb 2024; Alpha Elsec — 122 WH 5KG warheads Dec 2025; IOL — 178 IR sensors to SCD; Ashoka — 320 copper liners SCOMET 6A003.
- Logistical Interdictions: MV Marianne Danica (27 tonnes of explosives, Spain denial April 2024); MV Borkum (May 2024); Water Transport Workers Federation of India boycott (3,000 workers, 11 ports, Feb 2024). Reports: Al Jazeera 26 June 2024; Middle East Eye 20 Nov 2024 & 5 Dec 2024; Frontline interview Francesca Albanese 28 April 2026.
- UN Experts Statement 20 June 2024: “States and companies must end arms transfers to Israel immediately or risk responsibility”; UNHRC Resolution 5 April 2024 calling for a cease of arms transfers; India abstentions on 5 April 2024 and 18 Sept 2024 UNGA resolution endorsing ICJ Advisory Opinion.
- Corporate Exposure: CNN 5 June 2025 on Negev use; Open Source Munitions Portal OSMP1353 SkyStriker debris Khan Younis 17 April 2025; Breaking Defense 22 May 2024 on $760M Elbit ammunition order; MoD Israel $48M deal for land munitions.
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