“No Choice” But to Keep Hitting Iran “Until the Regime Falls” — And It Will Fall: The Peril of Perpetual War
Contents
- Executive Summary
- I. Factual Matrix: What We Actually Know
- II. The Barnea Doctrine: The Legal Fallacy of Forcible Regime Change
- III. Collapse of Diplomacy: The June MOU and Strait of Hormuz
- IV. The Hezbollah Channel: US Ambassador Authorized for Direct Talks
- V. Weaponization of Threat Narratives: The Barron Trump Plot Claim
- VI. Gaza: Killing During a Ceasefire
- VII. Shadow Diplomacy and Democratic Deficit: Ronen Bar & Shlomi Fogel
- VIII. Economic Warfare: Threatening Secondary Sanctions on Chinese Banks
- IX. Forced Displacement: 35,000 Barred from Return in the West Bank
- X. Spoiler Politics: Netanyahu, Ben Gvir and Smotrich
- XI. The International Legal Framework Under Assault
- XII. Human Security Impact Assessment
- XIII. Pathways to Sustainable Peace: 12-Point Policy Framework
- Conclusion: Light Does Not Come From Bombs
Executive Summary
On a Jerusalem Municipality stage in June 2026, former Mossad Director David Barnea, who led the agency for five years until June 2026, declared:
“In my assessment, there will be no choice but to intensify the economic, diplomatic and operational actions against this regime until it falls — and it will fall.”
Barnea added that the Iranian people “long for [the regime's] downfall” and that “the enlightened Western world wants it as well, led by the United States and Israel, which are more determined than ever.”
This is not a stray remark. It is a doctrine. And on the same news day — 28 August 2026 — eight other developments reported by The Times of Israel show precisely where this doctrine leads when operationalized:
- Diplomacy abandoned: The US is no longer interested in reviving the June Memorandum of Understanding on the Strait of Hormuz. President Trump, according to a senior diplomat from a mediating country, feels Iran “burned” him and now prefers to wait Iran out through sanctions, despite warnings about war unpopularity at home.
- Backchannel to Hezbollah: The US Ambassador to Lebanon, Michel Issa, has reportedly been green-lit to hold direct talks with senior Hezbollah figures to advance a US-brokered disarmament agreement that Hezbollah opposes.
- Assassination narrative: Iranian security chief Mohsen Rezaei denies a plot to assassinate President Trump's youngest son, Barron Trump, after Iranian state TV broadcast a video that triggered a Secret Service response.
- Ceasefire erosion in Gaza: IDF announces killing two Hamas commanders in Shati camp (Gaza City) and Khan Younis during a ceasefire, justifying it as “removing the threat” while accusing them of “systematically violating the ceasefire.”
- Shadow diplomacy exposed: Two stories break together — that Shin Bet chief Ronen Bar held direct hostage talks with exiled Hamas leaders from Oct 7, 2023 to Feb 2025 with PM and war cabinet approval (long censored), and that Netanyahu's associate Shlomi Fogel held a parallel secret channel with Hamas's Ghazi Hamad in 2014 during Operation Protective Edge, behind the backs of generals negotiating in Cairo.
- Economic warfare escalated: Trump hints at sanctioning Chinese banks for doing business with Iran: “Who said I'm not? You don't know if I'm doing it...”
- Mass displacement institutionalized: The government tells the High Court it will not allow return of ~35,000 Palestinians displaced from Jenin, Tulkarem and Nur al-Shams refugee camps since January 2025.
- Far-right consolidation: Netanyahu urges Otzma Yehudit (Ben Gvir) and Religious Zionism (Smotrich) to reunite to avoid falling below the electoral threshold.
As a human rights defender, my assessment is clear: There is always a choice. The choice between perpetual war and the rule of law. Between instrumentalizing the Iranian people's suffering and centering their human rights. Between shadow channels and democratic accountability.
I. Factual Matrix: What We Actually Know
Based solely on the provided Times of Israel live blog PDF, verified facts are:
Qatari Mediation
Qatari PM visits Tehran as White House says it is not holding any Iran talks. Qatar and Pakistan sought to restore MOU; US refused.
Hezbollah Talks
Lebanese network MTV reports US administration gave Ambassador Michel Issa green light for senior Hezbollah talks to advance disarmament.
MOU Collapse
June MOU fell apart within days over differing interpretations of vaguely written terms on reopening Strait of Hormuz.
Plot Denial
Mohsen Rezaei tells Al Manar TV that Barron Trump plot reports are a lie; says mediators asked Iran to list conditions for reopening Hormuz, including ending war in region; mentions Oman corridor.
Gaza Strikes
IDF: Bilal Ibrahim Saleh Raqi'i (anti-tank unit) killed in Shati, Azzam Rifat Abd Abadala (Khan Younis Brigade) killed in Khan Younis — both during ceasefire.
Hostage Talks
Channel 12: Censor allowed publication that Ronen Bar held direct talks with Hamas exiled leadership post-Oct 7, with approval. Bar was astounded when removed by Netanyahu in Feb 2025.
Fogel Channel 2014
Security officials confronted Netanyahu twice; twice he said he knew Fogel but not talks. Fogel summoned, claimed authorization, showed dozens of pages of meeting records. Yossi Cohen and Eyal Zamir involved.
West Bank Camps
Govt tells High Court: maintains IDF presence in 3 camps, credits operations since Jan 2025 for improving settler security; 35,000 reliant on humanitarian aid per ACRI petition.
II. The Barnea Doctrine: The Legal Fallacy of Forcible Regime Change
Barnea's statement contains three distinct claims that must be disentangled:
1. “No choice” — The false inevitability
International law rejects inevitability as justification for force. The UN Charter provides only two exceptions to Article 2(4)'s prohibition on use of force: self-defense under Article 51 and Security Council authorization under Chapter VII. “Intensifying operational actions until the regime falls” meets neither.
2. “Until the regime falls — and it will fall” — Prohibited purpose
⚖️ International Law: Prohibition of Forcible Regime Change
ICJ, Nicaragua v. United States (1986): Prohibits intervention “bearing on matters in which each State is permitted, by the principle of State sovereignty, to decide freely,” including political system. UNGA Resolution 2625 (Friendly Relations Declaration) prohibits forcible regime change. Rome Statute Article 8 bis defines aggression to include use of armed force against sovereignty.
Targeting a government as such, rather than a specific armed attack, converts a political objective into a military campaign. That is precisely what the Charter was designed to prevent after World War II.
3. “The people long for its downfall” — Instrumentalization
As a human rights defender, I affirm: Iranians do demand dignity, free expression, gender equality, and economic justice — as seen in Woman, Life, Freedom. But international human rights law protects their right to self-determination (ICCPR, ICESCR Common Article 1), not a right of external powers to bomb them into freedom. Empathy cannot be used as a pretext for collective punishment.
III. Collapse of Diplomacy: The June MOU and Strait of Hormuz
A senior diplomat from a mediating country confirms Wall Street Journal reporting: Trump no longer wants to revive the June MOU after feeling “burned.” Mediators Qatar and Pakistan continue efforts, but a US official says Trump prefers maintaining economic pressure, convinced sanctions will lead to capitulation on Hormuz reopening and nuclear curbs.
⚖️ UNCLOS: Freedom of Navigation
The Strait of Hormuz is an international strait under Part III of UNCLOS. All ships enjoy right of transit passage (Art. 38). Unlawful closure or threat of closure violates freedom of navigation and threatens international peace. 20% of global oil and 25% of LNG transits here. For Bangladesh, a net energy importer, closure means immediate price shock for transport, electricity, and food.
The diplomat warns the US will have to “wait Iran out for an extended period” and questions ability to do so given unpopularity. This is critical governance insight: sanctions as indefinite waiting game without exit criteria harms civilians while entrenching hardliners. The MOU's vague drafting (“reopening of Strait”) also reveals poor treaty craft — a governance failure that allowed differing interpretations to collapse it within days.
IV. The Hezbollah Channel: US Ambassador Authorized for Direct Talks
MTV Lebanon reports that Ambassador Michel Issa arriving at Lebanese ministry was authorized to talk to senior Hezbollah figures to advance a US-brokered Israel-Lebanon agreement aimed at disarming the group.
Governance analysis:
- Pragmatism: No disarmament in Lebanon can occur without Hezbollah, which opposes the agreement. Direct contact reduces miscalculation.
- Legal/policy tension: Hezbollah remains designated as a terrorist organization under US law. Authorizing an ambassador for direct political talks creates a de facto two-track policy — designation for sanctions, engagement for diplomacy.
- Sovereignty risk: If talks bypass the Lebanese state, it weakens the very state institutions the US says it wants to strengthen.
A rights-based approach would require: transparency to Congress, inclusion of Lebanese government, and clear humanitarian carve-outs to ensure talks do not legitimize impunity for past violations.
V. Weaponization of Threat Narratives: The Barron Trump Plot Claim
US Secret Service says it is aware of a video on Iranian state TV discussing plot to assassinate Barron Trump. Iranian security chief Mohsen Rezaei tells Al Manar it is a lie, while also stating Iran is preparing list of conditions for reopening Hormuz — including “ending the war in the region” — and that Iran agreed with Oman on a corridor.
Two governance lessons:
- State media incitement, even if later denied, triggers real security responses and escalatory cycles. Under ICCPR Art. 20, advocacy of assassination is prohibited.
- The same interview mixes denial with diplomatic offer (Oman corridor). This shows information warfare and negotiation occur on same channel — requiring careful verification, not amplification.
VI. Gaza: Killing During a Ceasefire
The IDF's own justification admits both operatives were killed during a ceasefire: “while systematically violating the ceasefire” and “carried out to remove the threat.”
⚖️ IHL: Law of Ceasefires
A ceasefire is a binding agreement to suspend hostilities. Violations must be addressed through agreed mechanisms, not unilateral lethal force unless facing imminent attack (Caroline test). Principles of distinction (only combatants), proportionality (excessive civilian harm prohibited), and precaution must still apply. Justifying strikes during ceasefire as “restoring capabilities” blurs law enforcement and hostilities paradigms.
The names, locations (Shati camp, Khan Younis), and units (anti-tank, Khan Younis Brigade) are given, but no evidence of imminence is provided. In a territory where 2.3 million civilians live in density, such strikes risk civilian harm and collapse of fragile truce — exactly what a peace-focused policy must prevent.
VII. Shadow Diplomacy and Democratic Deficit: Ronen Bar & Shlomi Fogel
Channel 12's two revelations on the same day are extraordinary:
A. The authorized channel: Ronen Bar
Shin Bet chief Ronen Bar held direct hostage negotiations with exiled Hamas leaders post-Oct 7 until Feb 2025, with approval of Netanyahu, war cabinet and security cabinet. Bar noted direct channel was more effective than mediators. Channel 12 knew in April 2025 but military censor barred publication until today — inviting resubmission today.
Channel 12 editorializes: censor decision may be linked to second report — implying message that “if direct contacts were acceptable after Oct 7 slaughter, what was problem with Fogel contacts before Oct 7?” Difference: Bar was authorized security official; Fogel was private businessman.
B. The unauthorized channel: Shlomi Fogel 2014
During Operation Protective Edge 2014, while three generals and Shin Bet head were in Cairo holding official ceasefire talks for PM, Fogel was secretly talking to Ghazi Hamad in Gaza. Senior security officials confronted Netanyahu twice; twice he claimed no knowledge. He told officials to tell Fogel to stop; told Yossi Cohen (then NSC head, later Mossad) to tell Fogel to stop; military secretary Eyal Zamir (now IDF chief) was in room. Fogel continued, showed “dozens of pages” of records, claimed authorization.
Governance diagnosis: This is textbook “plausible deniability” structure, echoing 1998 when Netanyahu used billionaire Ronald Lauder as secret emissary to Syrian President Hafez al-Assad on Golan. It bypasses institutional checks, creates competing negotiation tracks, and undermines rule of law. For public policy, requirement is clear: all emissaries must be registered, mandated in writing, and subject to Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee oversight.
VIII. Economic Warfare: Threatening Secondary Sanctions on Chinese Banks
Trump in Oval Office, 27 Aug 2026: “We don't want to speak to them. We're not looking to meet or anything.” On Russia doing business with Iran: “It depends. So far, I think Russia's behaved quite well, having to do with Strait of Hormuz…” On China: “Who said I'm not? You don't know if I'm doing it... I don't have to announce everything, do I?”
Secondary sanctions — punishing third-country banks for lawful trade with Iran under their own law — are extraterritorial. They fragment global financial system, raise compliance costs for Global South, and often violate humanitarian exemptions. When applied to Chinese banks, they also escalate US-China decoupling with spillover for all. A human rights-centered sanctions policy requires: clear humanitarian carve-outs, sunset clauses, independent impact assessments, and proportionality.
IX. Forced Displacement: 35,000 Barred from Return in the West Bank
Government tells High Court it opposes return to three camps cleared entirely by IDF since Jan 2025, crediting operations for improving settler security, wanting to maintain presence because armed groups will resume if army withdraws. ACRI petition says 35,000 now reliant on aid.
⚖️ Fourth Geneva Convention, Article 49 & Rome Statute
Individual or mass forcible transfers of protected persons from occupied territory are prohibited regardless of motive. Temporary evacuation allowed only if security of population or imperative military reasons so demand, and must be temporary with return as soon as hostilities cease. Maintaining presence for 8+ months and opposing return institutionalizes displacement. May constitute war crime under Rome Statute Art. 8(2)(b)(viii).
Security for settlers cannot be achieved by insecurity for Palestinians. Both must be protected under same legal standard.
X. Spoiler Politics: Netanyahu, Ben Gvir and Smotrich
Netanyahu urges Otzma Yehudit and Religious Zionism to run together, citing 2022 precedent: “Every time we were united, we won. When we were divided, we lost.” Poll shows separately, Religious Zionism fails threshold, Otzma Yehudit gets 6; together 8. Ben Gvir attacks Netanyahu, accusing him of wanting small Otzma Yehudit to join Gadi Eisenkot's Yashar party for “wide national government.”
For governance analysis, this shows how electoral threshold math incentivizes far-right consolidation and how war cabinets are affected by coalition survival logic — a classic spoiler dynamic in conflict studies where domestic electoral incentives prolong conflict.
XI. The International Legal Framework Under Assault
Together, these events assault five pillars:
- Prohibition on Use of Force (UN Charter 2(4))
- Self-Determination (UN Charter 1(2), Common Art. 1 ICCPR/ICESCR)
- International Humanitarian Law — distinction, proportionality, precaution, ceasefire sanctity
- Law of Occupation — GCIV, Hague Regulations: occupier as trustee, not sovereign
- Law of the Sea — UNCLOS transit passage
When all five are eroded simultaneously, we do not have isolated crises. We have systemic risk to rules-based order.
XII. Human Security Impact Assessment
Behind each policy memo is a person:
- A mother in Tehran unable to buy medicine because a bank in a third country fears secondary sanctions.
- A fisherman in Cox's Bazar whose diesel price spikes because Hormuz is threatened.
- A 14-year-old in Shati refugee camp who cannot sleep during a declared ceasefire.
- An elderly woman in Jenin camp living in a tent, told she cannot return because an army wants to “maintain presence.”
- A Lebanese shopkeeper in Beirut who wants a state, not a militia, to provide security.
Human security means security of people, not just security of regimes or states. It requires us to count these lives in every policy calculation.
XIII. Pathways to Sustainable Peace: 12-Point Policy Framework
Conclusion: Light Does Not Come From Bombs
Barnea said: “The enlightened Western world wants it as well, led by the United States and Israel, which are more determined than ever.”
As a Bangladeshi human rights defender — from a nation born from a struggle for self-determination against oppression — I offer a different definition of enlightenment.
Enlightenment is not a world that sees by the light of bombs. Enlightenment is a world that sees by the light of law.
The Iranian people deserve freedom from repression. The Israeli people deserve freedom from fear. The Palestinian people deserve freedom from occupation and displacement. The Lebanese people deserve freedom from militia rule and foreign intervention. These freedoms are not zero-sum. They are interdependent, guaranteed by the same Charter, the same Geneva Conventions, the same human rights covenants.
“No choice” is never true for a state bound by law. There is always a choice — and the choice must be peace.
Minhaz Samad Chowdhury
Independent Human Rights Defender and Governance & Public Policy Analyst
মানবাধিকার রক্ষাকর্মী ও সুশাসন এবং পাবলিক পলিসি বিশ্লেষক
Sylhet, Bangladesh
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