What Does It Cost to Become DC of Chattogram? Only 70 Crore Taka — An Alleged Deal and Its Rule of Law Implications
Documents reveal an alleged 70 crore taka agreement to secure Bangladesh’s most coveted field posting, backed by signed cheques and a promise to repay 140 crore “through work.” The paper trail raises fundamental questions about administrative integrity, not just individual conduct.
Key Findings: (1) A deputy secretary transferred to Chittagong Port Authority in December 2025 is linked in documents to financial arrangements allegedly aimed at securing the Deputy Commissioner post of Chattogram. (2) A July 16 document purports a 70 crore taka agreement with an obligation to repay 140 crore taka within 18 months “through work.” (3) Twelve cheques totaling 16.5 crore taka are listed as security. (4) The documents do not establish that funds were transferred or that appointments were purchased, and several claims could not be independently verified. (5) The Port Authority has formed an inquiry committee.
I. Introduction
A collection of contracts, bank cheques, and private messages has exposed what appears to be an elaborate effort to secure coveted government postings through payments worth crores of taka, offering a glimpse into an alleged market for influential positions inside Bangladesh’s bureaucracy.
At the center of the documents is Salahuddin Ahmed, a deputy secretary from the 28th batch of the administration cadre, transferred to the Chittagong Port Authority late last year. According to documents obtained by Daily Waadaa, Salahuddin allegedly sought appointment as Deputy Commissioner (DC) of Chattogram by paying a substantial sum.
This analysis does not determine guilt. Rather, it examines what the documents allege, what they can and cannot prove under Bangladeshi law, and what they reveal about systemic vulnerabilities when administrative postings become transactional.
II. Factual Matrix from the Documents
Chronology
Financial Guarantees
The document trail includes 12 cheques with a combined face value of 16.5 crore taka allegedly provided as security:
- 5 cheques drawn on Sonali Bank, Bogura Corporate Branch – total 11.5 crore taka
- 7 cheques drawn on City Bank – total 5 crore taka
Additionally, copies of service profile bearing official seal and signature, and the national identity card of his sister, Jiniat Khatun, were allegedly provided to intermediaries as reassurance.
III. Official Response and Institutional Action
When contacted, Salahuddin initially denied the allegations, stating his phone had been hacked, his cheques lost, and his NID stolen. He later acknowledged that groups regularly approach officials at the Secretariat with offers, though his comments did not amount to an admission that he had paid for a posting.
“Several groups are constantly going from room to room at the Secretariat with various offers for officials. These kinds of incidents happen there all the time and are still happening. There is no point denying it. It is because such things are happening that you have obtained these documents.”
He also stated no legal action was taken over the alleged hacking and theft: “No legal action was taken over these matters. But it should have been. That was my mistake.”
Syed Refayet Hamim, Secretary of the Chittagong Port Authority, confirmed that a committee had been formed after authorities received a complaint. “After receiving the investigation report, further action will be taken,” he told Waadaa, declining to identify committee members to protect the administrative process.
The source material explicitly states: The documents do not establish that the promised appointments were actually purchased, and some claims could not be independently verified. A signed cheque or agreement alone does not demonstrate that funds were transferred, and the material does not include bank records confirming that cheques were deposited or cleared. Nor does it establish who, if anyone, received money represented by the cheques.
Publication of allegations therefore requires strict adherence to presumption of innocence, verification standards, and distinction between documentary existence and proof of transaction.
IV. Rule of Law Analysis
As a legal researcher, four dimensions are critical:
1. Legal Framework for DC Appointments
Under the Bangladesh Civil Service (BCS) Administration Cadre rules, Deputy Commissioners are appointed by the Ministry of Public Administration from among deputy secretaries on the basis of seniority, performance, integrity reports, and administrative need. The post is not a commercial concession. Any payment for securing it would potentially violate:
- Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 (Sections 161-165) and Anti-Corruption Commission Act, 2004
- Bangladesh Civil Service Conduct Rules and Government Servants (Discipline and Appeal) Rules
- Money Laundering Prevention Act, if proceeds are projected as “repayment through work”
The phrase “repay 140 crore taka through work within 18 months” as a DC – a public official with a fixed government salary – raises an irreconcilable question: how could such a sum be legally generated from the functions of a Deputy Commissioner, whose duties are revenue administration, magistracy, and development coordination, not profit generation?
2. Property Rights and Financial Instruments
Use of non-judicial stamps and bank cheques as security transforms an alleged illicit bargain into a quasi-contractual form. This mirrors historical enclosure dynamics where customary informal influence was formalized through legally recognizable instruments. The cheques, if issued, create negotiable instruments under the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, but their underlying consideration would be void if for an illegal purpose (Section 23, Contract Act, 1872).
3. Governance Structures and Institutional Capture
The more concerning systemic issue is the alleged “market for postings.” If groups are indeed moving “from room to room at the Secretariat with various offers,” this suggests:
- Principal-agent failure: The state (principal) loses control over agents allocating postings.
- Conflict of interest: Intermediaries claiming proximity to political power blur the line between political and administrative spheres.
- Accountability gap: Absence of transparent criteria and public disclosure for why one officer is preferred over another for a lucrative field posting.
From a rule of law standpoint, this is the difference between rule by law (using administrative orders to effect a transfer) and rule of law (ensuring orders are made through merit-based, impartial, and auditable processes).
4. Due Process and Investigative Standards
A rule-of-law compliant response requires:
- An independent, time-bound inquiry with protection for whistleblowers and documents
- Forensic verification of signatures, stamps, and WhatsApp metadata
- Bank confirmation whether cheques were presented, and under what account
- Opportunity for the officer to be heard and to produce his claimed theft/hacking complaints (GDs)
- Publication of findings without compromising ongoing criminal investigation
V. Broader Implications
If even a fraction of such arrangements were to be normalized, the cost would not be limited to one posting. A DC controls land acquisition, hat-bazaar leases, government contracting oversight, and magisterial powers. An officer who must “recover” 140 crore taka through work is structurally incentivized toward rent extraction. The ultimate payers become citizens seeking everyday services – land mutation, licenses, relief distribution.
This is where the Enclosure parallel is instructive: just as parliamentary enclosures used lawful forms to privatize commons, modern administrative capture can use lawful transfer orders to privatize public authority. The form is legal; the substance erodes public trust.
VI. Recommendations for Strengthening Safeguards
- Publish DC appointment criteria and shortlists: Reasoned orders citing ACSR scores, integrity clearance from ACC, and performance.
- Mandatory asset declaration verification: Before and after field postings for DCs, SPs, and port directors.
- Centralize and log Secretariat access: Visitor management system for brokers and mandatory declaration of intermediaries.
- Protect negotiable instruments: Training for bank branches to flag large-value security cheques linked to public postings and report suspicious transactions to BFIU.
- Whistleblower channel: Independent portal under Ministry of Public Administration for anonymous reporting of posting-for-pay solicitations.
VII. Conclusion
The documents reviewed in this case allege a market, not just a misdemeanor. Whether the 70 crore taka agreement and the 140 crore taka repayment promise are authentic, enforceable, or executed remains to be established through forensic and financial investigation.
What is already clear, however, is that the mere plausibility of such deals – and the officer’s own admission that such offers circulate routinely in the Secretariat – signals a governance vulnerability that demands a rule-of-law response, not merely an administrative reshuffle.
For Bangladesh’s bureaucracy, the question is not only who becomes DC of Chattogram, but whether citizens can trust that the person who does holds that office as a public trustee, not as a debtor to private financiers.
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